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We estimate the effect of broadband infrastructure, which enables high-speed internet, on 
economic growth in the panel of OECD countries in 1996-2007. Our instrumental-variable 
model derives its non-linear first stage from a logistic diffusion model where pre-existing 
voice-telephony and cable-TV networks predict maximum broadband penetration. We find 
that a 10 percentage-point increase in broadband penetration raises annual per-capita growth 
by 0.9-1.5 percentage points. Results are robust to country and year fixed effects and 
controlling for linear second-stage effects of our instruments. We verify that our instruments 
predict broadband penetration but not diffusion of contemporaneous technologies like mobile 
telephony and computers. 
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1. Introduction 
High-speed internet access via broadband infrastructure has developed rapidly worldwide 
since the late 1990s. Broadband infrastructure allows the generation and distribution of 
decentralized information and ideas in markets increasingly relying on information as an 
input. In light of modern theories of endogenous growth (e.g., Romer 1990), this should 
accelerate economic growth by facilitating the development and adoption of innovation 
processes. In this way, broadband infrastructure may differ not only from other types of 
public infrastructure such as roads and bridges, but also from more traditional 
telecommunications infrastructure. While the latter’s impact on economic growth has been 
analyzed before (Röller and Waverman 2001), the new growth theories suggest that the 
growth effects of modern communication networks that have emerged since may have a 
different quality. Voice-telephony infrastructure has a coordination function and reduces 
transaction costs for existing businesses. On top of that, high-speed internet via broadband 
infrastructure may accelerate the distribution of ideas and information and foster competition 
for and development of new products, processes, and business models, thereby further 
facilitating macroeconomic growth.  
In this paper, we test the effect of broadband infrastructure on economic growth using an 
annual panel of 25 OECD countries in 1996-2007 (broadband introduction started in 1997 in 
the first country). Considering that broadband penetration may be endogenous to the growth 
process, our empirical identification builds on the idea that broadband roll-out tends to rely on 
traditional voice-telephony and cable-TV networks. Therefore, we specify a technology 
diffusion model in which variations in the ceiling of the broadband diffusion curve across 
countries are determined by the extent of the pre-existing traditional networks. Using only the 
part of the variation in broadband penetration that can be predicted by this diffusion model, 
we find a significant positive effect of broadband introduction and penetration on economic 
growth. Our instrumental-variable results suggest that a 10 percentage-point increase in the 
broadband penetration rate results in a 0.9-1.5 percentage-point increase in annual per-capita 
growth.  
Broadband internet and the underlying infrastructure fulfill many characteristics of a general 
purpose technology (GPT) that fundamentally changes how and where economic activity is 
organized (Harris 1998; Helpman and Trajtenberg 1998). With its potential to facilitate 
decentralized information processing and to support new working modes (Bloom and Van   2
Reenen 2007; Bloom, Kretschmer, and Van Reenen 2009), broadband may constitute a 
special technology with an impact on growth distinct from other technologies emerging 
around the same time. High-speed internet via broadband infrastructure facilitates the spatial 
distribution of large batches of information that previously had to be collocated, which in turn 
allows for new business models and collaboration of firms producing specialized inputs. This 
can lead to lower entry barriers and higher market transparency, thereby increasing both labor 
productivity and market competition and ultimately economic growth. Thus, some casual 
observers have linked the fact that OECD countries have grown substantially in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s to the contemporaneous emergence of broadband (OECD 2000).  
Indeed, we show that there is a significant positive association between broadband 
deployment and economic growth in the panel of OECD countries since the mid-1990s. 
However, this simple association may be driven by reverse causality and omitted variables. 
First, individuals in high-income countries may also have a high ability to pay for broadband 
services, resulting in more rapid broadband penetration. Second, state intervention in 
telecommunications might depend on the level of economic development in a country, thus 
confounding the effect of regulation and sectoral policies with the effect of broadband 
diffusion. Third, given the rapid technological change in the last decades, broadband diffusion 
took place at the same time as the diffusion of other technologies like mobile telephony and 
computers (Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito 2008), making it difficult to isolate the specific effect 
of broadband.  
To address these problems, we develop an instrumental-variable (IV) approach based on the 
fact that broadband deployment takes place alongside existing infrastructure elements, which 
creates path dependencies given the pre-existing heterogeneity in infrastructure across 
countries. Thus, our first-stage model is based on a diffusion model of broadband technology 
in which the extent of pre-existing fixed-line telephony and cable-TV networks determines 
the maximum reach of the broadband network in each country. These existing networks only 
affect the supply side of broadband diffusion and therefore rule out demand-side effects due 
to differences in wealth and growth and policy-induced effects. Drawing on the large 
literature on technology diffusion models (e.g., Geroski 2000), we specify a logistic diffusion 
curve where maximum broadband penetration is limited by the extent of the traditional 
networks. Combining these pre-existing instruments with the logistic shape of the diffusion 
curve allows us to predict broadband penetration in a country over time. The predicted values   3
of the broadband penetration rate from this non-linear first stage help us identify the effect of 
broadband on economic growth in the second stage.  
We specify two types of second-stage models. In the first, GDP per capita is modeled as a 
function of a dummy for broadband introduction in a difference-in-differences specification. 
Our IV results show that GDP per capita is about 2.7 to 3.9 percent higher on average after 
than before broadband introduction, controlling for country and year fixed effects. The second 
type of the second-stage model specifies a classical cross-country growth model where the 
broadband penetration rate is added as a determinant of the growth rate of GDP per capita. 
We find that an increase in the broadband penetration rate by 10 percentage points increases 
annual per-capita GDP growth by 0.9 to 1.5 percentage points over our sample period.  
Our results are robust to the inclusion of country and time fixed effects as well as a number of 
control variables and to the specific set of countries in our sample. Given that our first-stage 
model is non-linear, we can include our instruments linearly in the second-stage model, which 
again does not affect our results. Further, we show that our instruments indeed determine the 
ceiling for broadband but not the diffusion of other potentially growth-enhancing technologies 
like mobile telephony and computers diffusing at about the same time. These results confirm 
the validity of our instruments and underline the causal character of the growth effect of 
broadband infrastructure.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes prior work 
on broadband and economic growth. Section 3 introduces a simple growth regression 
framework and our database and presents results on the association between broadband 
penetration and economic growth. Section 4 develops our IV approach, presents results on the 
causal effect of broadband penetration on economic growth, and tests for instrument validity 
and robustness. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Literature on Broadband and Economic Growth  
Theories of endogenous growth model the generation and distribution of ideas and 
information as the key driver of economic growth (Lucas 1988; Romer 1990; Aghion and 
Howitt 1998). Against this background, high-speed internet via broadband infrastructure may 
affect the innovative capacities of the economy through development of new products, 
processes, and business models to promote growth. Moreover, cheaper information 
dissemination can facilitate the adoption of new technologies devised by others, which again   4
promotes economic growth (Nelson and Phelps 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel 2005). This also 
suggests that spillovers of codified knowledge across firms and regions may constitute 
another channel by which information technology in general and broadband deployment in 
particular affect economic growth.
1  
Broadband internet enables the exchange of data across multiple locations and aids 
decentralized information processing (see Hayek 1945 for a conceptualization of the 
importance of decentralized information processing). Every actor in an economic system uses 
existing information as an input to generate new informational output. During information 
processing, the actor can enrich and evaluate the initial information due to experience and a 
different perspective and understanding, which eventually leads to a multiplication of 
information for the benefit of all actors. Beyond the reduction of costs of existing business 
processes arising from the emergence of telecommunications infrastructure for voice 
telephony, high-speed internet enables the emergence of new business and firm-cooperation 
models that rely on the spatial exchange of large batches of information, which fosters 
competition and innovation processes. On the demand side, broadband internet may increase 
market transparency and thus additionally intensify competition.  
Broadband infrastructure, when combined with information technologies, can also affect firm 
productivity and economic growth in additional ways. The development of information 
technologies fundamentally changed and improved the processing of information, resulting in 
significant productivity growth of IT-using firms (Stiroh 2002; Jorgensen, Ho, and Stiroh 
2008). The recent literature on productivity effects of information technologies (IT) also 
recognizes that these effects depend on how information technologies are used and on the 
presence of complementary inputs such as skilled labor (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003) or 
organizational structure and practices (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002; Bloom and 
Van Reenen 2007; Bloom, Kretschmer, and Van Reenen 2009). The isolated analysis of a 
firm’s IT investment on productivity might also neglect positive interactive effects of a firm’s 
IT investments with broadband internet connecting actors across locations. For example, e-
procurement, e-billing, online recruitment, and customer services are activities that are only 
possible through both firm-level IT investment and economy-level broadband infrastructure.  
                                                 
1 By contrast, Audretsch and Feldman (1996) show that spillovers of tacit knowledge are regionally bound as 
they typically require face-to-face contact.   5
Although broadband infrastructure as a general purpose technology may have a more far-
reaching effect on economic growth than other, possibly similar technologies,
2 previous 
studies on earlier infrastructure technologies serve as a useful reference point both in 
methodological terms as well as in assessing the impact of broadband on economic growth. 
The effects of public infrastructure on growth found in the pioneering work by Aschauer 
(1989) have been criticized to be upward biased due to common time trends, reverse 
causality, omitted variables, and simultaneity. Subsequent analyses find effects of public 
infrastructure investment on growth that range from zero to effects that are comparable in size 
to the effects found by Aschauer (for overviews, see Munnell 1992 and Gramlich 1994). 
Furthermore, Fernald (1999) shows that investment in (road) infrastructure can only explain 
one-off, unrepeatable shifts in productivity but not permanent shifts in productivity growth. 
Closest to our study, Röller and Waverman (2001) analyze how voice telecommunications 
infrastructure affects economic growth across 21 OECD countries in the 1970s and 1980s. 
They use a simultaneous equation model to integrate demand and supply in the 
telecommunications sector into the aggregate economy. A country’s surface area and its 
government deficit identify the supply side of the model, as the surface area directly affects 
the size of the telecommunications network to be built and the government deficit determined 
governments’ financial ability to invest in telecommunications infrastructure at a time when 
state monopolies dominated in the telecommunications sector in most countries. Röller and 
Waverman (2001) find that about one third of growth in OECD countries over the period 
1971-1990 can be attributed directly or indirectly to telecommunications. While their 
estimates are a prime example of addressing causality issues in macroeconomic growth 
analyses, their period of observation could not yet cover the diffusion of broadband 
technology, which we study in our paper. As argued above, broadband infrastructure may 
affect economic growth in different ways from traditional telecommunications infrastructure.  
The association between broadband infrastructure and economic development has also been 
examined in two policy reports, Crandall, Lehr, and Litan (2007) and Gillett, Lehr, Osorio, 
and Sirbu (2006). Both reports exploit differences in broadband development across U.S. 
states and find positive associations between broadband penetration and different economic 
outcome variables such as employment, wages, and housing prices. However, these results 
                                                 
2 Crafts (2004) shows that the contribution of steam power as an example of GPT to productivity growth has 
been considerable and probably exceeds the productivity and growth effects of public infrastructure investment 
(Gramlich 1994).   6
cannot be interpreted as causal effects as both studies lack an empirical strategy to identify the 
role of broadband causally.  
3.  Model Framework, Data, and Descriptive Evidence 
3.1  A Simple Growth Regression Framework 
We start from a simple macroeconomic production function with constant returns to scale and 
the three inputs physical capital, human capital, and labor. Following Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil (1992), the steady state is given by:  
  it it it i it n h s A y 3 2 1 log log log log β β β + + + =  (1) 
Here, yit is GDP per capita in country i at time t, sit is the propensity to accumulate physical 
capital, hit is average human capital accumulation of the workforce, and nit is the growth rate 
of the workforce. Finally, Ai is the state of the technology in country i. In this framework, the 
empirical observation of continuous growth in per-capita GDP can be expressed by a 
technological state that persistently increases over time and thus drives economic growth. 
Assuming that the technological state evolves along an exponential growth path over time, it 
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where λi is the growth parameter of technological progress for country i.  
Assuming that the distribution of ideas and information via broadband internet increases the 
development of and competition for new products and processes and facilitates the adoption 
of new technologies devised by others, we expect broadband infrastructure to affect the 
growth parameter λi. To determine the effect of the introduction of broadband on economic 
growth, we start with the following simple specification: 
  it t i D t 1 α α λ + =  (3) 
Here,  αt are year dummies and Dit is a binary variable equal to one after country i has 
introduced broadband. This yields a difference-in-differences specification of equation (1): 
  it it it it it t i it n h s D y ε β β β α α α + + + + + + = 3 2 1 1 log log log  (4)   7
Thus, α1 gives the effect of the introduction of broadband introduction on GDP per capita, αi 
capture country-specific effects, and εit is an error term.  
The preceding specification assumes that there is a permanent shift in GDP per capita once 
broadband has been introduced. While this may be true if most benefits from broadband 
originate from availability and from early adopters, broadband penetration in the entire 
economy may also positively affect economic growth by continuously spurring innovation 
processes. To model the effect of broadband diffusion on economic growth, we write 
  i i B 1 α α λ + =  (5) 
Here Bi is the broadband penetration rate, i.e., the share of the population that has subscribed 
to broadband in country i. Taking first differences, this results in a modified equation (1) in 
which we additionally control for initial GDP per capita yi0, i.e., one year before the first 
appearance of broadband (Barro 1991): 
  it
B
it i it it it it it T y n h s B y ε β β β β β α α + + + Δ + Δ + Δ + + = Δ 5 0 4 3 2 1 1 log log log log  (6) 
We are primarily interested in the effects of persistent differences in broadband penetration 
rates among countries. We therefore control for the catching-up in broadband diffusion by 
including the years since broadband introduction in a country, 
B
it T . This ensures that we only 
compare rates of broadband penetration at the same point in the diffusion process, which may 
differ across countries.  
3.2  Data for OECD Countries 
Broadband penetration is measured as the number of broadband subscribers per 100 
inhabitants, provided by the OECD Broadband Portal. A broadband line is defined as a line 
(DSL, cable, fiber, or other) that offers download speeds of at least 256 kbit/s. The first 
country in our sample (Canada) started rolling out broadband in 1997. To start our analyses in 
the year before any broadband introduction, our first observation year is 1996.  
All data on economic performance are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook and are 
available until 2007. Real GDP is expressed in 2000 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and 
normalized by the working-age population, defined as the population aged 15-64 years, to 
control for demographic differences among countries. The propensity to accumulate physical 
capital is proxied by the ratio of real private non-residential fixed capital formation to real   8
private GDP. Human capital accumulation of the workforce is proxied by the average number 
of years of schooling of the population aged 15-64 (from OECD Education at a Glance). 
Complete data are available for a panel of 20 OECD countries on an annual basis in 1996-
2007 (see Table 1 for the list of countries). In models that do not control for investment and 
education, we can add five more countries with missing data on these control variables (the 
Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, South Korea, and Spain).
3 Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for the countries in our sample.  
In addition to the variables described above, Table 1 also reports the year of broadband 
introduction and the broadband penetration rate in 2008. Broadband first emerged in most 
countries in the years 1999 and 2000. There are some early adopters – Canada (1997) and the 
United States (1998) – and some late adopters – Greece (2003), Hungary (2001), and Ireland 
(2002). In 2008, the three leading countries in terms of broadband subscribers per 100 
inhabitants were Denmark (37.2%), the Netherlands (35.8%), and Norway (34.5%). Greece 
(13.5%), Portugal (16.0%), and Hungary (16.8%) have the lowest penetration in our sample. 
3.3  The Association between Broadband and Economic Growth 
Table 2 reports estimation results of equation (4) that models the effect of broadband 
introduction on GDP per capita in a difference-in-differences framework that contains fixed 
effects for each country and year. Model 1 refers to our sample of 20 OECD countries with 
complete data. Model 2 provides results for the same 20-country sample, but without controls 
for physical and human capital accumulation and working-age population growth. Changes in 
physical and human capital accumulation might be the result of innovation, e.g., labor saving 
technological progress leading to capital deepening and skill-biased technological change 
(Caroli and Van Reenen 2002). These innovations might in turn be the result of the 
introduction of broadband. Thus, including the above-mentioned controls suggests that Model 
1 estimates a lower bound of the growth-enhancing effect of broadband. Model 3 replicates 
Model 2 with the full sample of 25 countries. 
                                                 
3 Among the OECD countries, this excludes only Luxembourg (for reasons of size) and Mexico, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic, and Turkey, which do not have the required control variables and have GDP per capita and 
broadband penetration rates substantially below all other OECD countries.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
   GDP per 
capita (PPP) 
Growth of  




















Australia 40.74  (3.12)  0.02 (0.01)  0.14 (0.02)  6.46 (0.34)  0.013  (0.001)  1999 25.37  50.08  1.73 
Austria 43.18  (2.92)  0.02 (0.01)  0.16 (0.01)  6.00 (0.21)  0.004  (0.002)  1999 21.64  48.41  10.30 
Belgium 42.14  (2.79)  0.02 (0.01)  0.13 (0.01)  6.69 (0.29)  0.004  (0.003)  1999 28.09  45.52  36.01 
Canada 42.46  (3.13)  0.02 (0.01)  0.12 (0.01)  6.48 (0.08)  0.012  (0.001)  1997 29.02  60.70  26.57 
Czech Republic  23.09  (2.66)  0.03 (0.02)  –   5.31 (0.60)  0.004  (0.001)  2000 17.18  27.31  6.04 
Denmark 43.72  (2.75)  0.02 (0.01)  0.13 (0.01)  8.48 (0.25)  0.002  (0.002)  1999 37.18  61.77  23.56 
Finland 39.32  (4.47)  0.03 (0.01)  0.11 (0.01)  8.27 (0.06)  0.003  (0.001)  1999 30.70  55.45  16.44 
France 40.35  (2.36)  0.02 (0.01)  0.11 (0.01)  7.85 (0.13)  0.006  (0.003)  1999 28.05  56.70  3.65 
Germany 38.74  (2.27)  0.02 (0.01)  0.12 (0.01)  7.14 (0.51)  -0.002  (0.004)  2000 27.36  53.85  20.39 
Greece 30.94  (3.97)  0.03 (0.01)  0.11 (0.01)  5.82 (0.3)  0.005  (0.011)  2003 13.54  49.76  0.00 
Hungary 19.58  (2.97)  0.04 (0.01)  0.23 (0.01)  6.38 (0.51)  -0.001  (0.003)  2001 16.85  25.71  13.87 
Iceland 47.69  (5.10)  0.03 (0.02)  0.14 (0.04)  8.48 (0.22)  0.015  (0.014)  2000 32.82  58.31  0.45 
Ireland 44.08  (7.02)  0.05 (0.02)  0.09 (0.01)  5.59 (0.16)  0.021  (0.004)  2002 20.57  38.33  14.75 
Italy 37.74  (1.97)  0.01 (0.01)  –   6.10 (0.39)  0.000  (0.004)  2000 19.17  44.45  0.03 
Japan 38.75  (2.40)  0.02 (0.01)  0.14 (0.01)  8.92 (0.25)  -0.004  (0.003)  1999 23.57  50.88  10.03 
Netherlands 43.43  (3.15)  0.02 (0.01)  0.11 (0.01)  7.38 (0.62)  0.004  (0.001)  1999 35.83  54.28  37.34 
New Zealand  32.49  (2.57)  0.02 (0.01)  0.13 (0.01)  6.04 (0.12)  0.012  (0.004)  2000 21.87  46.26  0.08 
Norway 57.36  (3.49)  0.02 (0.01)  0.11 (0.01)  6.96 (0.2)  0.008  (0.002)  1999 34.49  56.70  15.17 
Portugal 24.80  (1.36)  0.02 (0.01)  –   5.66 (0.15)  0.005  (0.003)  2000 15.99  38.74  1.74 
South Korea  25.21  (3.59)  0.04 (0.04)  0.21 (0.03)  –   0.008  (0.003)  1999 32.04  43.06  14.60 
Spain 32.35  (2.70)  0.02 (0.01)  –   6.42 (0.43)  0.013  (0.013)  1999 20.78  39.04  1.11 
Sweden 44.58  (4.04)  0.02 (0.01)  0.12 (0.01)  7.63 (0.13)  0.005  (0.002)  1999 31.99  68.23  21.49 
Switzerland 46.93  (2.06)  0.01 (0.01)  0.15 (0.01)  6.59 (0.25)  0.006  (0.003)  2000 33.52  64.64  34.19 
United Kingdom  42.33  (3.54)  0.02 (0.01)  0.10 (0.01)  6.01 (0.12)  0.005  (0.001)  2000 28.54  52.74  3.56 
United States  54.77  (2.90)  0.02 (0.01)  0.11 (0.01)  6.62 (0.13)  0.013  (0.003)  1998 25.83  61.79  23.57 
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for economic indicators over the years 1996 to 2007. Economic indicators stem from the OECD Economic Outlook. 
Data on years of schooling are taken from OECD Education at a Glance. Data on the emergence and diffusion of broadband are from the OECD Broadband Portal. Data on 
telephone access lines and on cable-TV subscribers in the year before the first emergence of broadband are taken from ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 
Database; broadband first emerged in Canada in 1997. Capital formation/GDP refers to the ratio of real private non-residential fixed capital formation to real private GDP. 
Years of education refer to the population aged 15-64. Broadband penetration rate refers to broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants. Voice-telephony penetration rate refers 
to telephone access lines per 100 inhabitants. Cable-TV penetration rate refers to cable-TV subscribers per 100 inhabitants.   
Table 2: Broadband Introduction and GDP per Capita  
Dependent variable: Log of GDP per capita  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 




 (2.59)  (2.62)  (2.09  ) 
Log of capital formation/GDP  0.110
**    
 (2.35)     
Log of years of education  0.083     
 (0.54)     
Growth of working-age population  -0.006     
 (0.01)     
Country  dummies  yes yes yes 





 (13.03)  (255.64)  (  304.32) 
R
2  (within)  0.86 0.85 0.84 
Observations  240 240 300 
Countries  20 20 25 
Notes: OLS estimation for 1996-2007. Sample of OECD countries. Five countries drop from the full model due to lack of data on control variables. Robust t statistics in 
parentheses. Significance at 
* 10%, 
** 5%, 
*** 1% level.   11
The coefficient of the broadband introduction dummy is positive and significant in all three 
models. It is slightly larger in Model 2 without controls than in Model 1, as expected. The 
results suggest that after a country has introduced broadband, GDP per capita is on average 
between 1.9 and 2.5 percent higher than before its introduction, controlling for country and 
year fixed effects. 
Table 3 reports estimation results of equation (6) that models the effect of broadband 
diffusion on growth in GDP per capita in a standard cross-country growth regression 
framework. Again, Models 1 and 2 use the 20-country sample, where Model 1 includes 
changes in physical and human capital accumulation and population growth and Model 2 does 
not. Model 3 again uses all 25 countries. The coefficient on the broadband penetration rate is 
positive and significant in all three specifications. The coefficient estimate is again larger in 
the model without controls. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that a ten percentage-
point increase in the broadband penetration rate is associated with an increase in the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.65 to 0.91 percentage points.  
However, the results of both sets of regressions cannot be interpreted as causal effects of the 
introduction and diffusion of broadband. As discussed above, the timing of broadband 
introduction and its subsequent diffusion may depend on the demand of the population for 
new technologies or sector-specific regulation in telecommunications, which may bias the 
OLS results. 
4.  The Causal Effect of Broadband Infrastructure on Economic Growth 
4.1  Instrumental Variables Derived from a Technological Diffusion Model 
The associations between broadband and economic growth reported so far may suffer from 
different sources of endogeneity bias. One concern is reverse causality, in that both the year of 
broadband introduction and its subsequent penetration may be endogenous and depend on 
economic development. In wealthy countries, the demand of the population for new 
technologies might drive the emergence and diffusion of broadband. This is in line with 
Comin and Hobijn (2004), who provide evidence that most of the 20 technologies they study 
over two centuries are adopted first in advanced economies and subsequently trickle down to 
countries that lag economically.    
Table 3: Broadband Diffusion and Growth of GDP per Capita  
Dependent variable: Growth of GDP per capita   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 




  (3.08) (4.31) (3.03) 




  (2.95) (3.89) (2.59) 
Growth of capital formation/GDP  0.069
***    
 (6.76)     
Growth of years of education  -0.007     
 (0.30)     
Δ Growth of working-age population  -0.231     
 (1.06)     









  (6.98) (7.68) (8.60) 
R
2  0.30 0.19 0.11 
Observations  240 240 300 
Countries  20 20 25 
Notes: OLS estimation for 1996-2007. Sample of OECD countries. Five countries drop from the full model due to lack of data on control variables. Broadband penetration 




*** 1% level.   13
Another source of endogeneity may be state intervention in the telecommunication sector. 
State intervention will typically depend on economic development in a country, thus 
confounding the effect of regulation with the effect of broadband diffusion. This issue has 
become evident in the response to the economic crisis in 2008 and 2009, when the 
governments of many countries initiated economic stimulus packages to dampen the 
economic downturn and stimulate growth. Many of these packages emphasize investments in 
high-speed internet and promote the roll-out of broadband networks (OECD 2009). 
We address these endogeneity concerns using an instrumental-variable (IV) approach based 
on the fact that most commonly used broadband standards (e.g. ADSL, VDSL) rely on the 
copper wire of the voice-telephony network or the coaxial cable of the cable-TV network 
between the main distribution frame or the street cabinet and the household. In countries 
where fiber is rolled out to the homes (i.e., broadband via fiber-to-the-home, FTTH), the 
existing ducts of the traditional networks are used to reduce deployment cost of broadband. In 
other words, access to one of these existing infrastructure elements built for other purposes 
than the provision of broadband is necessary for economically viable fixed-line broadband 
roll-out. These existing elements are therefore relevant instruments for fixed-line broadband 
deployment to determine its causal effect on economic growth. We thus assume that the 
maximum reach of broadband γi (i.e., the ultimate “ceiling” of broadband penetration) is 
determined by the extension of the voice-telephony and cable-TV networks that existed prior 
to broadband infrastructure:  
  0 2 0 1 0 _ _ i i i net cable net tel α α γ γ + + =  (7) 
To represent the extent of the traditional telecommunication and cable networks, we use the 
number of telecommunication access lines per 100 inhabitants in the year 1996 (tel_neti0) and 
the number of cable-TV subscribers per 100 inhabitants in 1996 (cable_neti0), i.e., in the year 
before the first country introduced broadband. Data on telecommunication access lines and 
cable-TV subscribers are taken from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database. The last two columns of Table 1 provide 
descriptive statistics on both variables. The number of telecommunication access lines per 
100 inhabitants in 1996 ranges from 25.7 in Hungary to 68.2 in Sweden. The number of 
cable-TV subscribers per 100 inhabitants in 1996 ranges from 0.03 in Italy to 37.3 in the 
Netherlands.    14
Based on the work of Griliches (1957), a large body of research has found that the extensive 
margin of the diffusion of a new technology in country i at time t is best described through a 
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 (8) 
Again, Bit is the broadband penetration rate in the population. The diffusion curve can be 
characterized by the parameters γ,  β, and τ that determine the maximum broadband 
penetration level (saturation level), the diffusion speed, and the inflexion point of the 
diffusion process, respectively. At the inflexion point τ, the diffusion curve has its maximum 
growth rate β/2. εit is an error term. 
Inserting equation (7) into equation (8), we obtain a non-linear first-stage equation. Based on 
non-linear least squares estimation, we calculate from this equation counterfactual values of 
broadband penetration that are determined purely by exogenous factors. We then use these 
predicted values of broadband penetration rates in our second-stage growth regressions. We 
also calculate the predicted year of broadband introduction for each country from this 
diffusion curve. Here, we use the year in which predicted broadband penetration reaches one 
percent as the predicted year of introduction of broadband. Using a non-linear first stage to 
generate fitted values that are subsequently used in the second-stage equation is not innocuous 
because it generates consistent estimates only if the non-linear first-stage model is correctly 
specified (Angrist and Krueger 2001). However, the vast empirical literature on technology 
diffusion confirming the logistic shape of the diffusion process (Geroski 2000) provides 
confidence in the specific non-linear model. Moreover, our first-stage diffusion model allows 
us to obtain time-variant predicted values of broadband penetration rates even though the 
instruments are time-invariant.  
4.2 Instrumental-Variable  Results 
The first stage of our IV model is a logistic model of technology diffusion, estimated by non-
linear least squares. Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 present the parameter estimates of the first-
stage regressions using both the 20-country and the 25-country sample. In both samples, the 
size of the voice-telephony network and the size of the cable-TV network have statistically 
                                                 
4 While the logistic form tends to capture the extensive margin of diffusion (the take-up of users) – as measured 
in our paper – very well for a vast number of technologies, Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito (2006) show that it does 
not capture the intensive margin of diffusion (reflecting the intensity of use) for many technologies well.   15
significant positive effects on the saturation level γi of the broadband diffusion curve in a 
country. The F-tests of joint significance (26.7 and 32.2, respectively) reject the null 
hypothesis of both coefficients jointly being zero. The logistic shape provides a very good fit 
to the broadband diffusion process across countries, and the average inflexion point of the 
diffusion curve is estimated around the year 2004. The same holds if the control variables of 
the second-stage model (investment, education, and population growth) are added (Model 3).
5  
To illustrate the broadband diffusion curves and the fit of our first-stage models, Figure 1 
plots the actual and predicted values of the broadband penetration rate for the sample of 25 
OECD countries. The logistic shape of the diffusion process of broadband technology is 
directly visible in most countries. There is no joint pattern in the deviation of the predicted 
values of broadband penetration from actual values across countries. For example, in South 
Korea all predicted values are below the actual values, while in Germany the predicted values 
are consistently above the actual values. In South Korea, the government has exerted great 
financial effort to roll out fiber-to-the-home, resulting in high actual broadband penetration 
rates, which is not reflected in the predicted values. In contrast, given the high penetration rate 
of the cable-TV network in Germany, predicted broadband penetration rates are higher than 
the actual values. However, in Germany the cable-TV network was owned by the incumbent 
telephone network operator until 2003, which had little incentive to update the cable network 
for broadband purposes. After the sale of the cable network by the incumbent following 
pressure by the European Commission, broadband via cable networks has been evolving since 
2005. Both examples show that state intervention plays an important role for broadband 
diffusion. However, from a political-economy perspective, these interventions might simply 
be the reaction to unsatisfactory developments in a country, making such interventions 
endogenous (Duso and Röller 2003). Our instrumental-variable approach is designed to avoid 
these confounding effects. 
                                                 
5 The results reported below are based on Models 1 and 2 without additional control variables, as the two stages 
are estimated separately. Results are very similar when based on the first stage with additional controls.   
Table 4: The Diffusion Curve: First Stage of the Instrumental-Variable Model 
Dependent variable: Broadband penetration rate  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 




  (6.16) (4.59) (7.24) 




  (2.11) (2.54) (2.47) 




 (15.60)  (13.36)  (9.15) 




 (10423.78)  (10508.86)  (7939.33) 
Log of capital formation/GDP     0.035
** 
     (2.24) 
Log of years of education     0.034
* 
     (2.08) 
Growth of working-age population     0.347 
     (0.86) 
Constant (γ0) -0.057  0.002  -0.104
** 
  (1.25) (0.04) (2.25) 
R
2  0.96 0.93 0.95 
F-test (cable-TV pen. rate = voice-tel. pen. rate = 0)   26.69  32.18  31.92 
Observations  260 325 240 
Countries  20 25 20 
Notes: Non-linear least squares estimation for 1996-2008. Diffusion speed and inflexion point do not vary across countries. By contrast, the saturation level is country-specific 
and is a linear function of the voice-telephony penetration rate and the cable-TV penetration rate in the year before the first emergence of broadband. Model 3 contains 
additive control variables and is for 1996-2007. Sample of OECD countries. Five countries drop from the full model due to lack of data on control variables. Robust t statistics 
in parentheses. Significance at 
* 10%, 
** 5%, 
*** 1% level.  
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Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan
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Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States
Actual broadband rate Predicted broadband rate
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Notes: Actual and predicted broadband penetration rates over 1996-2008 for 25 OECD countries. Predicted values are derived from non-linear least squares estimations of a 
diffusion curve as reported in Table 4. Diffusion speed and inflexion point do not vary across countries. By contrast, the saturation level is country-specific and is a linear 
function of telephone access lines per 100 inhabitants and cable-TV subscribers per 100 inhabitants in the year before the first emergence of broadband.   18
Results of the second-stage model that estimates GDP per capita as a function of broadband 
introduction in a difference-in-differences framework (i.e. equation (4)) are reported in 
Models 1-3 of Table 5. In all three model specifications, broadband introduction (as predicted 
by the first-stage diffusion model) has a strongly significant positive effect on GDP per 
capita. To account for the fact that broadband penetration is itself the result of a (non-linear) 
first-stage estimation, standard errors are bootstrapped (500 repetitions) in this and the 
subsequent models. Across our three model specifications, the results imply that after the 
introduction of broadband, GDP per capita was 2.7 to 3.9 percent higher than before, 
controlling for country and year fixed effects. In all three specifications, the IV results are 
slightly larger than in the OLS regressions, suggesting that the OLS regressions are downward 
biased. However, only in Model 3 is the difference between OLS and IV estimates 
statistically significant.  
To test the assumption of this difference-in-differences approach that countries that have not 
(yet) introduced broadband and countries that have introduced broadband had the same time 
trends before broadband introduction, Models 4-6 additionally include “placebo introduction 
dummies” for points in time before the introduction of broadband that is actually predicted. 
Specifically, the models include placebo introduction dummies for two and three years before 
broadband introduction, i.e., before the predicted broadband penetration rate reached 1 
percent.
6 The placebo introduction dummies do not enter the model significantly. What is 
more, the effect of broadband introduction on GDP per capita is hardly affected at all by the 
inclusion of the placebos. Similarly, placebo introduction dummies for two and three years 
after actual broadband introduction (not shown) do not enter the model significantly and do 
not change the result on actual broadband introduction.
7  
                                                 
6 We do not include the placebo dummy for one year before introduction because in some countries 
counterfactual broadband penetration rates in this year are very similar to those in the counterfactual year of 
introduction. The maximum of the broadband penetration rate in the year before introduction was 0.99 percent, 
while the minimum in the year of introduction was 1.003 percent, making the difference somewhat arbitrary. In 
contrast, the counterfactual broadband penetration rate for two years before introduction has a maximum value 
of 0.53 percent. 
7 Results for the post-introduction placebo dummies are available from the authors on request.  
Table 5: The Effect of Broadband Introduction on GDP per Capita: Second Stage of the Instrumental-Variable Model 
Dependent variable: Log of GDP per capita  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 







  (2.84) (3.18) (4.56) (2.79) (3.10) (4.60) 
Log of capital formation/GDP  0.107
**    0.108
**    
  (2.11)     (2.13)    
Log of years of education  0.088      0.088     
  (0.61)     (0.60)    
Growth of working-age population  0.043      0.028     
  (0.06)     (0.04)    
Dummy 2 years before broadband introduction        0.006  0.007  -0.001 
       (1.14)  (1.18)  (0.11) 
Dummy 3 years before broadband introduction        0.010
* 0.009 0.001 
       (1.93)  (1.63)  (0.11) 
Country  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 








  (12.10) (65.67) (61.41) (12.05) (65.11) (61.22) 
R
2  (within)  0.86 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.84 
Observations  240 240 300 240 240 300 
Countries  20 20 25 20 20 25 
Notes: Second-stage estimation for 1996-2007. The year of broadband introduction is predicted from the first-stage diffusion curve reported in Table 4, referring to the year in 
which the predicted broadband penetration rate was larger than 1%. Sample of OECD countries. Five countries drop from the full model due to lack of data on control 
variables. Bootstrapped z statistics in parentheses. Significance at 
* 10%, 
** 5%, 
*** 1% level.   20
Our alternative second-stage model in equation (6) is based on a standard growth regression 
framework. As shown in Models 1-3 of Table 6, (first-stage predicted) broadband diffusion 
has a statistically significant positive effect on growth in GDP per capita. An increase in the 
broadband penetration rate by ten percentage points increases annual per-capita growth rates 
by 0.9 to 1.5 percentage points. To provide an example, 10 percentage points is approximately 
the difference in the broadband penetration rates between Germany and the leading OECD 
countries in 2003. Thus, a simple counterfactual thought experiment suggests that if in 
Germany broadband penetration had increased by 10 percentage points in 2003, GDP per 
capita would have been 3.7 to 5.9 percent higher in 2007. As in the previous model, the IV 
coefficients on broadband are larger than in the OLS regressions, with the difference being 
statistically significant in Models 2 and 3, but not in the full Model 1.  
Models 4-6 add time lags in the growth-enhancing effect of broadband. This is based on the 
idea that the effect of dissemination and processing of information enabled by new broadband 
infrastructure may not show immediately but may take some time. The coefficients are hardly 
larger (1.2 to 1.6 percentage point growth contribution) than the baseline results in Models 1-
3, suggesting that nearly the whole growth-enhancing effect of broadband appears already 
contemporaneous to the diffusion of broadband.  
In Table 7, we add a full set of country fixed effects to the growth regression. In this 
specification, identification comes only from variation in growth rates within countries over 
time. Still, we can identify significant positive effects of the broadband penetration rate on 
growth rates which are rather precisely identified and, in the case of the first two models, even 
larger than without the country fixed effects. Models 4-6 additionally include time dummies 
for three-year intervals (1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007, with 1996-1998 as the 
reference time period) to capture different phases of global economic growth. Again, the 
estimated effect of broadband diffusion on growth in per-capita GDP is hardly affected.   
Table 6: The Effect of Broadband Diffusion on Growth of GDP per Capita: Second Stage of the Instrumental-Variable Model 
Dependent variable: Growth of GDP per capita  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Predicted broadband penetration rate  0.092
*** 0.135
*** 0.145
***      
  (3.57) (5.27) (4.10)       




      (4.05)  (5.20)  (4.49) 







  (3.92) (5.40) (4.03) (4.66) (5.53) (4.24) 
Growth of capital formation/GDP  0.069
***    0.071
***    
  (5.73)     (5.28)    
Growth of years of education  -0.004      -0.018     
  (0.19)     (1.18)    
Δ Growth of working-age population  -0.18      -0.227     
  (0.77)     (0.98)    















  (10.29)  (11.59) (8.36) (11.72)  (12.33) (7.74) 
R
2  0.29 0.19 0.12 0.35 0.25 0.14 
Observations  240 240 300 220 220 275 
Countries  20 20 25 20 20 25 
Notes: Second-stage estimation for 1996-2007. Broadband penetration rates and year of broadband introduction are predicted from the first-stage diffusion curve reported in 
Table 4. Sample of OECD countries. Five countries drop from the full model due to lack of data on control variables. Bootstrapped z statistics in parentheses. Significance at 
* 10%, 
** 5%, 
*** 1% level.  
Table 7: The Effect of Broadband Diffusion on Growth of GDP per Capita: Instrumental-Variable Results with Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable: Growth of GDP per capita  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 







  (2.97) (4.23) (2.79) (2.63) (3.62) (1.85) 







  (2.92) (3.98) (2.61) (2.13) (2.65) (2.55) 
Growth of capital formation/GDP  0.061
***    0.068
***    
  (4.04)     (4.56)    
Growth of years of education  0.003      0.002     
  (0.14)     (0.11)    
Δ  Growth  of  working-age  population  -0.248    -0.242    
  (1.03)     (1.10)    
Country  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 








  (8.37) (9.56)  (10.94)  (7.84) (8.86) (9.05) 
R
2  (within)  0.27 0.15 0.06 0.30 0.17 0.10 
Observations  240 240 300 240 240 300 
Countries  20 20 25 20 20 25 
Notes: Second-stage estimation for 1996-2007. Broadband penetration rates and year of broadband introduction are predicted from the first-stage diffusion curve reported in 
Table 4. Models 4-6 include dummies for three-year time intervals (1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007; 1996-1998 is the reference interval). Sample of OECD countries. 
Five countries drop from the full model due to lack of data on control variables. Bootstrapped z statistics in parentheses. Significance at 
* 10%, 
** 5%, 
*** 1% level.  
Table 8: The Effect of Broadband Diffusion on Growth of GDP per Capita: Critical Mass Specification 
Dependent variable: Growth of GDP per capita  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Predicted broadband penetration rate  -0.103  -0.061  0.099 
  (0.94) (0.55) (0.84) 
Years since predicted broadband introduction  -0.001  -0.003  -0.005
** 
 (0.62)  (1.55)  (2.37) 
Dummy for predicted broadband penetration rate ≥ 0.1  -0.013  -0.012  0.002 
   (1.23)  (1.05)  (0.19) 
Interaction (broadband pen. rate ≥ 0.1) * broadband pen. rate  0.188
* 0.200
** 0.044 
   (1.90)  (2.00)  (0.44) 
Dummy for predicted broadband penetration rate ≥ 0.2  0.009  0.012  0.011 
 (0.64)  (0.84)  (0.80) 
Interaction (broadband pen. rate ≥ 0.2) * broadband pen. rate  -0.052  -0.075  -0.057 
   (0.71)  (0.97)  (0.73) 
Growth of capital formation/GDP  0.067
***    
 (5.59)     
Growth of years of education  -0.001     
 (0.04)     
Δ Growth of working-age population  -0.213     
 (0.90)     









 (10.11)  (11.40)  (8.40) 
R
2 0.31  0.21  0.13 
Observations 240  240  300 
Countries 20  20  25 
Notes: Second-stage estimation for 1996-2007. Broadband penetration rates and year of broadband introduction are predicted from the first-stage diffusion curve reported in 
Table 4. Dummies for having passed 10% and 20% broadband penetration rates as well as interactions of these dummies with the broadband penetration rates are included to 
test for network externalities. Sample of OECD countries. Five countries drop from the full model due to lack of data on control variables. Bootstrapped z statistics in 
parentheses. Significance at 
* 10%, 
** 5%, 
*** 1% level.   24
Communication infrastructure is sometimes argued to be subject to network effects. As a 
consequence, the effect of broadband infrastructure on economic growth may not be linear. 
Specifically, broadband penetration may need to reach a “critical mass” to realize its full 
impact on economic growth. To test for this, we include interaction terms of the predicted 
broadband penetration rate and step dummies for having reached at least 10 and 20 percent 
broadband penetration rates. Note that broadband penetration rates range between 13.5 and 
37.2 percent in 2008. The results of this specification are reported in Table 8. While 
multicollinearity among the different broadband measures hampers precise identification, in 
this specification a statistically significant positive effect of broadband penetration on 
economic growth emerges only when the 10 percent threshold is passed. Reaching values 
above 20 percent broadband penetration does not have an additional effect beyond the effect 
of 10 percent penetration. 
4.3  Tests for Instrument Validity and Robustness 
Existing networks for voice telephony and cable TV were completed well before the 
introduction of broadband and were installed for purposes other than broadband use, i.e., for 
voice telephony and the transmission of TV signals. Given that we measure the extent of the 
voice-telephony and cable networks in 1996, they are pre-determined when considering 
broadband diffusion. However, pre-determination does not necessarily constitute exogeneity 
in the econometric sense. In this section, we analyze whether the voice-telephony and cable 
networks might have an independent direct effect on economic growth or affect economic 
growth through other channels than broadband.  
In principle, our instruments – the extension of the traditional telephone and cable networks – 
might not only affect the deployment of the broadband network but also the diffusion of other 
growth-enhancing technologies, such as mobile telephony (Gruber and Verboven 2001; Koski 
and Kretschmer 2005) and computers (Caselli and Coleman 2001). To test if this is true, we 
consider the diffusion of mobile telephony and computers which also emerged in the 1990s. 
We consequently estimate diffusion curves following equation (8) for mobile telephony and 
computers where the ceiling γi is again determined by the penetration of the traditional fixed-
line telephone network and the cable-TV network. Data on the number of mobile-telephony 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants and computer users per 100 inhabitants are taken from the 
ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database. The results are reported in Table 9. 
We find no significant effects of penetration of the traditional networks on the diffusion of   25
mobile telephony and computers. Voice telephony and cable TV only determine broadband 
diffusion and not the diffusion of other potentially growth-enhancing technologies, 
underlining the validity of our instruments. 
Fixed-line voice telephony could also have a direct effect on growth (Röller and Waverman 
2001). However, the direct effect of fixed-line voice telephony is expected to weaken with 
upcoming substitutes such as mobile telephony and voice-over-IP telephony, so that the direct 
effect of fixed-line voice telephony is likely to have subsided in our period of analysis, 
starting in the late 1990s.
8 Moreover, our models control for the initial level of GDP per 
capita in 1996, the year before broadband was first introduced, which would capture any 
potential indirect effects of voice-telephony and cable-TV networks on GDP per capita 
growth through past GDP per capita.  
Still, the non-linear form of our first stage allows us to test for any effects that the fixed-line 
voice-telephony and cable-TV networks might have on growth. In Model 1 of Table 10, we 
include the number of telecommunication access lines per 100 inhabitants in 1996 and the 
number of cable-TV subscribers per 100 inhabitants in 1996 in addition to the predicted 
broadband penetration as potential separate growth determinants in the second stage of our 
growth model. In this model, identification of the effect of broadband on growth relies on the 
fact that our first stage is non-linear while the second stage is a linear model, and not on 
excluded variables. In line with our argument that the direct impact of traditional fixed-line 
voice telephony on economic growth will have subsided by 1996, both the share of 
telecommunication access lines and the share of cable-TV subscribers are insignificant. In 
contrast, broadband penetration still has a significant positive effect of similar magnitude as in 
our baseline IV specification.  
                                                 
8 According to OECD (2007) figures, the time spent on public switched telephone network (PSTN) calls is 
declining in most OECD countries. For example, the number of PSTN minutes declined by 44% between 2003 
and 2005 in Iceland and by more than 20% in Austria and Belgium. Among these minutes are increasing cases of 
users making calls to mobiles.   
Table 9: Traditional Networks and the Diffusion of Mobile Telephony and Computers 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Dependent variable:   Mobile subscribers  Computer users 
Voice-telephony penetration rate  0.257  3.049
* 
  (0.79) (2.03) 
Cable-TV penetration rate   -0.186  0.700 
  (0.74) (0.94) 
Diffusion speed (β) 0.548
*** 0.149
*** 
  (12.38) (5.53) 
Inflexion point (τ) 1.999.347
*** 2.005.767
*** 
  (11636.54) (367.34) 
Constant (γ0) 0.827
*** -0.497 
  (5.11) (1.25) 
R
2  0.96 0.95 
F-test (cable-TV pen. rate = voice-tel. pen. rate = 0)  0.67  2.06 
Observations 200  183 
Countries 20  20 
Notes: Non-linear least squares estimation for 1996-2005. Diffusion speed and inflexion point do not vary across countries. By contrast, the saturation level is country-specific 
and is a linear function of telephone access lines per 100 inhabitants and cable-TV subscribers per 100 inhabitants in the year before the first emergence of broadband. Sample 





Table 10: Additional Robustness Specifications 
Dependent variable: Growth of GDP per capita  Model 1  Model 2
a  Model 3  Model 4 





  (3.26) (3.57) (3.29) (3.64) 





  (3.75) (3.78) (3.99) (3.98) 
Voice-telephony  penetration  rate  -0.009     
  (0.95)     
Cable-TV penetration rate   -0.003       
  (0.37)     
Trade openness      0.007
***  
     (2.83)  
Log of years of education        -0.009 
      ( 1 . 2 2 )  





  (5.47) (5.07) (6.14) (5.54) 
Growth of years of education  -0.002  -0.001  -0.008  0.0004 
  (0.09) (0.03) (0.35) (0.02) 
Δ  Growth  of  working-age  population  -0.174 -0.196 -0.195 -0.179 
  (0.75) (0.78) (0.87) (0.76) 











  (8.80) (9.58) (6.96) (4.56) 
R
2  0.23 0.29 0.32 0.30 
Observations  240 216 240 240 
Countries  20 18 20 20 
Notes: Second-stage estimation for 1996-2007. Broadband penetration rates and year of broadband introduction are predicted from the first-stage diffusion curve reported in 




*** 1% level. 
a Model 2 excludes Canada and the United States.    28
As an additional aspect, one might argue that countries that are prone to competition, market 
liberalization, deregulation, and international trade may also have had a highly developed 
voice-telephone and cable-TV network. To test for this, we exclude Canada and the United 
States from our sample as in all other countries, the preexisting networks were deployed by 
state monopolies. Thus, remaining countries seem to share similar attitudes towards market 
liberalization and regulation at least in the telecommunication sector.
9 We further control for 
trade openness as measured by the sum of imports and exports over GDP, since broadband 
deployment might also reflect the level of openness and connectedness of a country. Data on 
imports and exports are from the OECD Economic Outlook. Both excluding Canada and the 
United States (Model 2 in Table 10) and adding trade openness (Model 3) does not change 
our basic result of broadband having a positive and economically meaningful effect on 
economic growth. 
Cross-country analyses on technology diffusion demonstrate that the adoption of new 
technologies is associated with high levels of human capital (Caselli and Coleman 2001; 
Caroli and Van Reenen 2002). Models of endogenous growth (Lucas 1988; Romer 1990; 
Aghion and Howitt 1998) further state that the effect of human capital is not limited to 
increased labor productivity. Human capital also increases the innovative capacity of an 
economy, which in turn results in new processes and products, consequently promoting 
growth. Therefore, one could argue that the diffusion of broadband may proxy for the level of 
human capital. To test for this, we include the average number of years of schooling of the 
working-age population in levels in addition to its growth rate in our growth regression.
10 The 
results are presented in Model 4 of Table 10. Again, including the level of years of schooling 
does not diminish the impact of broadband diffusion on economic growth.
11 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, one might add a regulatory index that reflects the attitudes towards regulation in the different 
countries. However, consistent time series on regulatory attitudes are not available for our complete observation 
period. Moreover, the development of attitudes towards regulation is not exogenous but may depend on the 
evolution of the telecommunication sector and the economy. 
10 For a discussion of empirical evidence on the effects of levels of and growth in years of schooling, see 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008). 
11 We experimented with firm-level micro data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European 
Union to gauge at possible channels through which broadband may affect growth. Unfortunately, for our 
purposes this database provides only two waves (CIS3 in 1998-2000 and CIS4 in 2002-2004) for nine countries 
(covering some 70,000 firms). Although these data limitations prohibit far-reaching interpretations, controlling 
for country and time fixed effects and clustering standard errors at the country x survey level, we find a positive 
effect of the national broadband penetration rate on radical product innovations that are new to the market and on 
process innovations. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.    29
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the effects of broadband infrastructure on economic growth. Based 
on annual data for a panel of OECD countries and using an instrumental-variable approach, 
we find that the introduction and diffusion of broadband had an important impact on growth 
in GDP per capita. After a country has introduced broadband, GDP per capita is 2.7 to 3.9 
percent higher on average than before its introduction, controlling for country and year fixed 
effects. In terms of subsequent diffusion, an increase in the broadband penetration rate by 10 
percentage points raises annual growth in per-capita GDP by 0.9 to 1.5 percentage points.  
Our results are robust to numerous tests and the inclusion of additional control variables. Our 
instrument for the supply of broadband, the penetration of underlying network infrastructure 
technologies, is successful in removing potential sources of reverse causality between growth 
and broadband diffusion and is shown to determine the deployment of broadband, but not of 
other technologies emerging around the same time. This provides confidence that our 
approach indeed isolates the causal effect of broadband infrastructure.  
We close by discussing two limitations of our study. First, our measure of broadband is a 
rough one insofar as it considers any bandwidth over 256 kbit/s to be broadband. That is, the 
available data does not allow us to consider differences in the average or maximum 
bandwidths across countries, so that we concentrate on analyzing the extensive margin of 
broadband diffusion, i.e., the number of broadband users. Clearly, extensive diffusion may not 
tell the full story, as a new technology may be used more or less intensively by its users.
12 
However, as we are interested in the wide range of opportunities arising from increasing 
broadband deployment, extensive diffusion constitutes an informative measure. Second, given 
that broadband did not emerge until the mid-1990s and that technologies get replaced by new 
technologies like mobile broadband, our results represent medium-term effects for the period 
in which fixed broadband represents the main driver to enable firms to improve through new 
products, processes, and business models. Long-run projections of the effect of broadband on 
growth cannot be made without a longer sample period and a better understanding of the role 
that broadband may play in triggering further infrastructure innovations in the future. 
However, our results show an economically significant and robust effect of broadband 
diffusion on economic growth even in the time span of just over a decade. This evidence can 
                                                 
12 Grajek and Kretschmer (2009) document and analyze the considerable heterogeneity across users and 
countries for the case of mobile telephony.    30
serve as a lower bound for the potential long-term effects of broadband infrastructure, which 
can be adequately assessed only once longer time series become available.    31
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